We examine whether the board of directors adjusts the sensitivity of CEO compensation to earnings following an earnings restatement. Using a sample of 598 restating firms and 2,065 non-restating firms during the period of 1995-2011, we find that firms decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to accounting earnings after restatements and that this decrease is more pronounced for firms that appoint new CEOs after restatements than those whose CEOs continue to remain in office after restatements. Furthermore, the results suggest that the decrease in the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings for restating firms with new CEOs is more pronounced for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership. This highlights the monitoring role of institutional investors in the redesign of compensation contracts following restatements. Overall, our results are consistent with the argument that the board adjusts the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings downwards following restatements to constrain earnings management and recover public confidence in the firm.
Introduction
The revelations of serious accounting scandals in the United States over the last decade at prominent companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco have revealed major shortcomings in the functioning of an important institution of corporate governance -the board of directors. A competent and knowledgeable board acting as an agent of the shareholders has a fiduciary responsibility to monitor and appropriately formulate the level and form of management compensation contracts (Jensen, 1993) . We focus on this primary responsibility of the board in this study and examine its monitoring effectiveness with respect to executive compensation structure in response to the quality of financial reporting by the management. Specifically, we examine whether boards adjust the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings following an earnings restatement.
One of the most important management motivations for earnings management results from management compensation contracting (Healy and Wahlen 1999) . Healy and Palepu (2003) have attributed the failure of Enron, WorldCom and the likes, partly to sub-optimal management compensation contracts, which in turn induce dramatic earnings management. Therefore, examining whether the board of directors optimally responds to the manipulation of earnings-based performance measures by altering the terms of the compensation contract is an important empirical question and throws light on the monitoring effectiveness of the board in fulfilling its fiduciary responsibilities towards the shareholders.
Prior literature has focused on examining the association between the incidence of restatements and equity compensation, especially stock options. For example, Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) document a positive association between the likelihood of restatements and the level of executive stock option grants. Cheng and Farber (2008) find that firms reduce the grants of CEO stock options following restatements. However, the literature has largely ignored the effect of restatements on cash compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to performance measures. Cash compensation is a significant component of executive total pay. Core et al. (2003) report that for a sample of 2,271 CEOs from ExecuComp over the period of 1993-2000, CEO cash pay on average accounts for about 30% of total pay (including cash pay, long-term incentive plan payouts, stock grants and option grants). 8 Furthermore, given that bonus is the major part of cash compensation and bonus contract is explicitly written on accounting earnings, examining whether the board adjusts the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings following an earnings restatement constitutes a natural and an important setting to examine our research question. Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Sloan (1993) predict that an optimal compensation contract should put lesser weight on relatively noisier performance measures. When earnings are distorted through earnings management, they become noisy in representing true managerial effort. We therefore hypothesize that the board should reduce the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings following restatements to alleviate the extent of moral hazard.
We identify 598 restating firms and 2,065 nonrestating firms during the period of 1995-2011. The empirical analyses are conducted on two samples; one which includes only restating firms and a larger sample that includes both restating and non-restating firms. Using the sample of restating firms enables us to use the firm as its own control and mitigate the possibility of any unobservable firm characteristics confounding the accuracy of our results. On the other hand, the empirical advantage of using a full sample enables us to compare restating firms with nonrestating firms in order to better control for the temporal trend in CEO compensation structure during our analysis period (e.g., Murphy 1999; Cheng and Farber 2008). We thus draw our inferences based on both samples. Consistent with our expectation, the results using both samples show that firms decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings following restatements. In addition, firms also decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to stock prices after restatements. This result is consistent with the notion that "garbling" financial information through earnings management also affects stock prices in the short-run (Narayanan 1985; Stein 1989 ) and thus stock prices for restating firms may also be a noisy proxy for managerial effort. Our results also suggest that the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings for restating firms is higher in the pre-restatement period than for non-restating firms during the same period, but lower in the post-restatement period relative to non-restating firms. These results are consistent with the argument that extreme levels of sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings are likely to induce an earnings restatement and the board adjusts this sensitivity downwards following the restatement in order to constrain earnings management and recover public confidence in the firm.
To address the possibility that accounting irregularities and errors may affect pay performance sensitivity for restating firms differently, we further classify restatements into accounting irregularities and errors using the procedure proposed by Hennes et al. (2008) . However, we do not find any evidence that the decrease in pay performance sensitivity following restatements differs between accounting irregularities and errors. This is consistent with prior findings that the board takes disciplinary actions against top executives even for firms with non-fraudulent restatements (e.g., Burks 2011) . We next examine whether the decrease in the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices following restatements differs for firms whose CEOs continue to remain in office after restatements and for those who hire new CEOs following restatements. This is an important question because recent empirical evidence has documented that executive pay practices seem to be driven more by the power and influence of the CEO on the board rather than traditional principalagent theory (Bebchuk and Fried 2006) . Since our research focus is on examining board monitoring of compensation, it is insightful to examine whether the adjustment of compensation contract by the board following restatements is affected by the power and influence of the CEO.
We divide restating firms into two groups: firms with extant CEOs (i.e., the current CEO is the same as the CEO involved in the restatement) and firms with new CEOs (i.e., the current CEO is different from the CEO involved in the restatement). The results suggest that firms unambiguously decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices following restatements for new CEOs. Furthermore, the downward adjustment of the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings is less pronounced for firms retaining CEOs following restatements, consistent with the managerial power theory that extant CEOs may have sufficient power to influence pay performance sensitivity.
Finally, we examine the role of institutional investors in influencing the decision of the board to reduce pay performance sensitivity following restatements. Monitoring by institutional investors is an important governance mechanism for corporate management (e.g., Hartzell and Starks 2003; Chen et al. 2007; Gillan and Starks 2007; Aggarwal et al. 2011) . Because institutional shareholders hold their shares on behalf of individuals or other entities, they have a fiduciary duty to understand how such corporations are managed and how their executives are compensated. We find that the decrease in the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings following restatements for new CEOs is more pronounced for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership.
As an additional analysis, we compare the effects of restatements on the sensitivity of cash compensation in the pre-SOX period to those in the post-SOX period by partitioning the full sample into two subsamples: the pre-SOX sample and the post-SOX sample. The results based on the post-SOX sample are consistent with those based on the full sample. In contrast, the results based on the pre-SOX sample suggest that firms do not decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings in the pre-SOX period. This result is consistent with the explanation that board-level monitoring may be deficient in the pre-SOX period. We also conduct additional analyses to examine the effects of restatements on the sensitivity of equity compensation. We find no significant effects of restatements on the sensitivity of equity compensation to earnings and stock prices.
To summarize, our study makes several important contributions to the literature on executive compensation and corporate governance. First, our study provides evidence consistent with the principleagent theory (e.g., Lambert and Larcker 1987; Sloan 1993 ) by documenting a decrease in the sensitivity of cash compensation to noisier earnings after restatements. The literature on restatements (e.g., Burns and Kedia 2006; Cheng and Farber 2008) has largely ignored the effect of restatements on cash compensation, especially the sensitivity of cash compensation to performance measures, although cash compensation constitutes a significant portion of executive pay. Our results complement this literature by highlighting the implications of earnings restatements for cash compensation contracts.
Second, our results suggest that the board of directors appears to perform its monitoring obligations effectively by decreasing the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings when earnings have been manipulated. This is a comforting finding because skeptics have questioned the role of the board in recent times about its monitoring effectiveness with respect to how executives are being compensated. This study also depicts the significant power and influence wielded by CEOs in deciding the terms of their compensation arrangements (Bebchuk and Fried 2006) ; consequently additional corporate governance mechanisms may be needed to monitor and control managers, especially in situations when the CEOs involved in restatements continue to remain in office.
Finally, this study also contributes to the literature on the monitoring role of institutional investors (e.g., Hartzell and Starks 2003; Gillan and Starks 2007) by showing that the decrease in the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings for firms that appoint new CEOs after an earnings restatement is stronger for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership. This result suggests that institutional monitoring can act as a complement in reinforcing the monitoring effectiveness of the board in terms of modifying the compensation contract after an earnings restatement event.
Section 2 discusses the literature most relevant to our study. Section 3 formulates the theory behind our hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the research methodology employed to test the hypotheses. Section 5 discusses sample construction. Section 6 throws light on our empirical findings. Section 7 concludes.
Literature review
Our study is broadly related to studies that investigate the association between the structure of compensation contracts and aggressive financial reporting. Below, we briefly review these studies before we develop our primary hypotheses. Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue that one of the most important motivations for earnings management comes from management compensation contracting. As long as earnings or other benchmarks are used as performance measures in compensation contract, managers will have incentives to manipulate these performance measures in their own interest. Early studies focused on how bonus compensation contract could motivate opportunistic earnings management by managers (Healy 1985; Guidry et al. 1999; Gaver et al. 1995; Holthausen et al. 1995) . More recent studies have linked managerial equity compensation to high degree of earnings management. For example, Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is greater and earnings management is more prevalent at firms in which managers' wealth is more closely tied to the value of stock, most notably via stock options. Similarly, Burns and Kedia (2006) show that firms whose CEOs have large stock options are more likely to file earnings restatements.
The literature has found that managers' opportunistic behaviors can be limited by welldesigned corporate governance arrangements. More specifically, prior studies find that earnings management and restatements are less likely for firms with more independent board or audit committee (Beasley 1996 (Palmrose et al. 2004 ), a decrease in the information content of earnings (Wilson 2008) , and a higher reliance on debt financing instead of equity financing (Chen et al. 2013) . Some studies have also focused on the effectiveness of corporate governance arrangements to take corrective actions following an earnings restatement. For example, earlier studies find that accounting restatements (Desai et al. 2006 ) and earnings management (Hazarika et al. 2012 ) increase the likelihood of subsequent CEO turnover and director turnover (Srinvasan 2005). In contrast, Burks (2011) finds that for firms with no fraudulent restatements, boards are more likely to terminate CFOs or rely on bonus penalty in the post-SOX period to discipline top executives in response to restatement events.
Given the wealth of evidence on the economic consequences of earnings restatements and the effectiveness of the board in terminating the CEO, CFO or directors, surprisingly little evidence exists on whether the board of directors alters the terms of compensation contracts in response to opportunistic earnings management. Our study attempts to fill this important void in the literature by examining the change in the design of compensation contracts, especially pay performance sensitivity, following earnings restatements.
Hypothesis development
A variety of reasons have been advanced in the literature to explain the popularity of earnings in executive compensation contracts. The theoretical underpinnings for doing so are enshrined in the seminal work of Holstrom (1979) . He showed that any informative signal, even if noisy, provides additional information about the agent's efforts and actions. Therefore, earnings-based performance measures, such as the return on assets, supplement stock prices by revealing more information about the agent's actions than do stock prices alone. Furthermore, accounting earnings may reflect factors that are within the executive's control, while marketwide fluctuation in stock prices may reflect market factors that are beyond management control (Gibbons and Murphy 1990) . Consistent with these arguments, researchers have found that accounting earnings have significant incremental explanatory power for cash compensation above and beyond stock prices.
The board of directors' responsibility to determine optimal executive compensation contracts also involves choosing appropriate weights on performance measures in these contracts. Our study is closely linked to the literature on the sensitivity of cash compensation to performance measures. The theoretical and empirical insights from research in this area are that the sensitivity of cash compensation to a performance measure, such as accounting earnings, is increasing in the precision of this performance measure (Banker and Datar 1989; Lambert and Larcker 1987; Bushman and Indjejikian 1993; and Sloan 1993) . Baber et al (1998) demonstrate that the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings varies positively with earnings persistence. Since earnings persistence is a desirable attribute of earnings in that it reflects the ability of the earnings number to predict future earnings and cash flows, the implicit conclusion seems to point to an effective monitoring role of the board of directors in mitigating CEOs' excessive focus on current earnings. More recent studies find that higher credibility of financial information is related to higher pay performance sensitivity (Bushman et al. 2006; and Banker et al. 2009 ).
Extensive anecdotal evidence suggests that earnings restatements have a detrimental effect on the credibility of financial information following restatements. 9 Furthermore, the precision of earnings We also expand the above research question to settings where the CEO of the firm may or may not continue to remain in office following restatements. The managerial power hypothesis developed by Bebchuk and Fried (2006) argues that observed executive pay practices cannot be explained by a model in which shareholders contract optimally with managers. Rather, they argue that a more accurate characterization of the CEO pay process is one in which the CEO effectively sets his own pay, subject to some constraints by the market. This is in sharp contrast to the predictions for the structure of executive compensation contracts using the principalagent approach, in which management receives an optimal incentive contract given the underlying contracting problem.
Prior studies (e.g., Desai et al. 2006) suggest that earnings restatements lead to management turnover, suggesting that the board of directors imposes a significant penalty on managers violating GAAP. When a CEO continues to remain in office after an earnings restatement, it suggests that the CEO may have strong power and influence within the firm and on its policies, such as the design of compensation contracts. Several studies provide evidence consistent with the argument that CEOs' involvement and power in firms with earnings restatements jeopardize the strength of corporate governance, such as the effectiveness of boards and audit committees. For example, Carcello et al. (2011) finds that the negative association between auditor committee independence (or expertise) and the likelihood of restatements is raised questions about the credibility of accounting practices, the quality of financial disclosure, and oversight in the U.S.
less pronounced for firms with CEOs involved in the selection of board members, suggesting that CEO involvement in the director selection process reduces auditor committee effectiveness. Carver (2014) finds that both the influence and the involvement of the CEO in the nominating process positively affect the retention of audit committee members following restatements.
Therefore, we argue that the decline in the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings following a restatement is likely to be less pronounced for firms that retain the CEO after the restatement. In other words, extant CEOs by virtue of their continued employment within the firm following an earnings restatement are those that may have a significant power and influence in determining the terms of their compensation contracts, and thus are more likely to be shielded from the downward adjustment of the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings following restatements. Hence we present our second hypothesis in the alternative form as follows:
H2: The downward adjustment of the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings following an earnings restatement is likely to be lower for firms that retain the CEO after the restatement event compared to those that do not retain the CEO.
In our final hypothesis, we focus on restating firms with new CEOs and explore the role that institutional ownership can play in influencing the board's decision to adjust the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings downwards following an earnings restatement. Prior research argues that relative to individual investors, institutional investors are more likely to effectively monitor agents and reduce agency costs because of their relatively higher stakes and lower coordination and communication costs ( We expect that institutional monitoring can help reduce the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings for restating firms with new CEOs. In other words, we expect the downward sensitivity adjustment regarding accounting earnings for restating firms with new CEOs (as stated in H2) to be supplemented by institutional monitoring, resulting in an even steeper drop in the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership. Our final hypothesis is formulated in the alternative form as:
H3: The downward adjustment of the sensitivity of cash compensation to accounting earnings for restating firms with new CEOs after restatements is likely to be more pronounced for firms that have a higher level of institutional ownership.
Research methodology
We conduct our empirical analyses based on both the sample of restating firms and the full sample including restating and non-restating firms. Using the sample of restating firms enables us to compare the same set of firms before and after restatements, and thus mitigates the effects of potential confounding factors such as unobservable firm characteristics related to CEO compensation. The advantage of using the full sample is that we can compare restating firms with non-restating firms to control for the temporal trend in CEO compensation structure during our analysis period (Murphy 1998; Cheng and Farber 2008) . We thus draw our inferences based on both samples.
We use the following basic changes model to examine the effect of restatements on the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices for both the restating sample and the full sample.
SALESQ SALE
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Gibbons and Murphy 1990; Sloan 1993), ΔLNTCC is the change in natural logarithm of CEO annual cash compensation, where cash compensation is defined as total salary plus bonus. 10 POST is a dummy variable equal to zero for non-restating firms or for restating firms in the pre-restatement period, and one for restating firms in the post-restatement period. ΔROA is the change in the return on assets at the end of each fiscal year. 11 RET is the raw stock return for each 10 Several studies (e.g., Baber et al. 1996) use the change in cash compensation scaled by base salaries in the prior year as the dependent variable. Our main results remain unchanged, if this alternative dependent variable is used. 11 As a robustness check, we also use the return on equity instead of return on assets as an alternative accounting 
RESTATE equals one for restating firms, and zero for non-restating firms. In model (2), β 2 captures the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings for non-restating firms, while β 2 +β 9 and β 2 +β 4 +β 9 measure the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings for restating firms in the pre-and postrestatement periods, respectively. Similarly, β 3 captures the sensitivity of cash compensation to stock prices for non-restating firms, while β 3 +β 10 and β 3 +β 5 +β 10 measure the sensitivity of cash compensation to stock prices for restating firms in the pre-and post-restatement periods, respectively. A negative coefficient on POST*ROA in models (1) and (2) would be consistent with hypothesis 1 that firms decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings after restatements. Hennes et al. (2008) indicate the importance of distinguishing accounting irregularities from errors in research on accounting restatements. To address the possibility that accounting irregularities and errors may have different impacts on pay performance sensitivity for restating firms, we first classify restatements into accounting irregularities and errors using the procedure proposed by Hennes et al. (2008) . Specifically, restatements are treated as irregularities if the firm explicitly uses variants of "fraud" or "irregularity" to describe the restatement, or if there is a related SEC or Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation or an independent investigation into the misstatement. Restatements not meeting any of these criteria are treated as errors. We then add a dummy variable indicating accounting irregularities vs. errors (IRRE) and its interactions with performance measures into models (1) and (2). Specifically, the following models are used to examine whether irregularities can provide incremental explanatory power for the change in pay performance sensitivity following restatements. 
IRRE equals one for restating firms in the postrestatement period with restatements classified as irregularities (i.e., IRRE = 1 if RESTATE = 1 and restatements are classified as irregularities), and zero otherwise. β 4 and β 5 measure the effects of restatements classified as errors on the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices, respectively, while β 12 and β 13 measure the incremental effects of restatements classified as irregularities on the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices, respectively. Hypothesis 2 suggests that the decrease in the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings following restatements should be lower for firms retaining their CEOs after restatements. To examine whether restatements affect pay performance sensitivity for extant and new CEOs differently, we add a dummy variable indicating whether restating firms retain their CEOs after restatements as well as its interaction with ΔROA and RET into models (1) and (2) . The modified models are stated below: 
EXCEO is a dummy variable equal to one for restating firms in the post-restatement period with extant CEOs (i.e., EXCEO = 1 if POST = 1 and the CEO involved in the restatement remains in position), and zero otherwise. In models (5) and (6), β 5 and β 6 measure the effects of restatements on the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices, respectively, for restating firms with new CEOs, while β 5 + β 7 and β 6 + β 8 measure the effects of restatements on the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices, respectively, for restating firms with extant CEOs. Hypothesis 2 suggests that β 5 should be negative and β 7 should be positive.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that the decrease in the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings for restating firms with new CEOs should be more pronounced for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership. We use the following models to examine the effects of institutional ownership and other corporate governance variables on the changes in pay performance sensitivity following restatements for firms with new CEOs. 
RET
NEWCEO is a dummy variable equal to one for restating firms in the post-restatement period with new CEOs (i.e., NEWCEO = 1 if POST = 1 and the current CEO is different from the one involved in the restatement), and zero otherwise. INST is institutional ownership. Three additional corporate governance variables are also considered: CEOOWN, DIRPER, and DIROWN. CEOOWN is the ownership of the CEO, calculated as the number of shares held by the CEO divided by the number of shares outstanding. DIRPER is the percentage of independent directors, calculated as the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors in the board. DIROWN is the ownership of independent directors, calculated as the total number of shares held by independent directors divided by the number of shares outstanding.
The coefficient on INST*NEWCEO*ΔROA (β 14 ) in models (7) and (8) captures the incremental effect of institutional ownership on the decrease in the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings after restatements for firms with new CEOs. Hypothesis 3 suggests that β 14 should be negative.
Sample selection and descriptive statistics
We start with all the firms with available changes in annual CEO After merging various databases, we eliminate observations with missing data to calculate all the necessary variables. Finally, to alleviate the effect of outliers, we delete the top and bottom 1% distribution of the variables used in the regression analyses. The full sample includes 17,073 firm-year observations for 598 restating firms and 2,065 non-restating firms.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample. The mean of total equity compensation (mean of TEC = 3.55 million dollars) is much larger than the mean of total cash compensation (mean of TCC= 1.33 million dollars), consistent with the fact that stock option and restricted stock have been the major incentive instruments for CEO compensation since 1990s. The means and the medians of ΔLNTCC and ΔLNTEC are positive, suggesting an annual increase in CEO cash and equity compensation for the majority of the sample firms. Furthermore, the sample firms appear to be heavily owned by institutional investors (mean and median of INST = 0.639 and 0.699, respectively). In contrast, both CEOs and independent directors only hold a small percentage of outstanding shares (means of CEOOWN and DIROWN = 0.02 and 0.008, respectively).
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables separately for restating and nonrestating firms. Columns I and II compare descriptive statistics for restating firms before and after restatements. Relative to the pre-restatement period, restating firms in the post-restatement period experience a significant decrease in total cash compensation (TCC: difference = -197.1 and p-value = 0.000) and a significant decrease in the annual change in cash compensation (ΔLNTCC: difference = -0.071 and p-value = 0.000), but a significant increase in the change in the return on assets (ΔROA: difference = 0.006 and p-value = 0.001). The results are consistent with hypothesis 1 that the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings decreases following restatements. In contrast, stock returns and the change in equity compensation in the post-restatement period are not significantly different from those in the prerestatement period.
Furthermore, restating firms also exhibit a significant decrease in CEO ownership (CEOOWN: difference = -0.007 and p-value = 0.000), but a significant increase in institutional ownership (INST: difference = 0.239 and p-value = 0.000), the percentage and the ownership of independent directors (DIRPER: difference = 0.145 and p-value = 0.000; DIROWN: difference = 0.001 and p-value = 0.078), suggesting an improvement of corporate governance following restatements for restating firms.
The comparison of the variables between restating firms in the post-restatement period and nonrestating firms is similar to that between the pre-and the post-restatement periods for restating firms, except that the return on assets and the ownership of independent directors for restating firms in the postrestatement period are lower than those for nonrestating firms (ROA: difference = -0.006 and p-value = 0.002; DIROWN: difference = -0.001 and p-value = 0.011). Table 2 presents the industry distribution of restating and non-restating firms based on industry classifications specified in Barth et al. (1998) . Columns I and II (columns III and IV) report the number and the proportion of restating (nonrestating) firms in each industry as a percentage of the total number of restating (non-restating) firms. Column V reports the ratio of the number of restating firms to the total number of firms for each industry. The sample of restating firms (598 firms) tends to concentrate in the industries of durable manufacturers (17.89%), computers (13.71%), and retail (19.57%). The sample of non-restating firms (2,065 firms) tends to concentrate in the industries of durable manufacturers (20.63%), computers (13.08%), and financial institutions (15.45%). Furthermore, column V suggests that compared to the other industries, the retail industry is more likely to have restatements with the number of restating firms (117 firms) accounting for 40.48% of all the firms in the industry. Table 4 reports the effects of restatements on the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices. Columns I and II present the results for the sample of restating firms based on models (1) and (3), respectively. As expected, the change in cash compensation (ΔLNTCC) is positively associated with both the change in return on assets (ΔROA) and stock returns (RET) at the 0.01 level. Consistent with hypothesis 1, the coefficient on POST*ΔROA is negative at the 0.01 level (coefficient = -0.949 and -0.969 in Columns I and II, respectively), suggesting that firms decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings following restatements.
TCC is CEO annual cash compensation in thousands of dollars, defined as total salary plus bonus. ΔLNTCC is the change in natural logarithm of TCC from t-1 to t. TEC is CEO annual equity compensation in thousands of dollars, calculated as the value of stock options granted plus the value of restricted stocks granted. ΔLNTEC is the change in natural logarithm of TEC from year t-1 to year t. ROA is the return on total assets, calculated as the income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year. ΔROA is the change in ROA from year t-1 to year t. RET is the raw stock return for the fiscal year. SALE is sales revenue. RESTATE is a dummy variable equal to zero for nonrestating firms or for restating firms in the pre-restatement period, and one for restating firms in the post-restatement period. IRRE is a dummy variable equal to one for restating firms in the post-restatement period with restatements classified as irregularities (i.e., IRRE = 1 if RESTATE = 1 and the restatement is classified as irregularities), and zero otherwise. EXCEO is a dummy variable equal to one for restating firms in the post-restatement period with the same CEO as the CEO involved in the restatement (i.e., EXCEO = 1 if RESTATE = 1 and the current CEO is the same as the CEO involved in the restatement), and zero otherwise. NEWCEO is a dummy variable equal to one for restating firms in the post-restatement period with a CEO different from the CEO involved in the restatement (i.e., NEWCEO = 1 if RESTATE = 1 and the current CEO is different from the CEO involved in the restatement), and zero otherwise. INST is institutional ownership. CEOOWN is the ownership by the CEO, calculated as the number of shares held by the CEO divided by the number of shares outstanding. DIRPER is the percentage of independent directors in the board. DIROWN is the ownership by independent directors, calculated as the total number of shares held by independent directors divided by the number of shares outstanding.

Empirical Results
Main results
Interestingly, the coefficient on POST*RET is also significantly negative (coefficient = -0.107 and -0.132 in Columns I and II, respectively), suggesting that firms also decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to stock prices after restatements. This is consistent with the notion that when earnings are manipulated, stock prices that incorporate accounting information also tend to deviate from fundamental values (Stein 1989; Narayanan 1985) . Consequently, boards are likely to put a lower weight on stock prices in periods after earnings restatements. In the absence of reliable accounting or market-based measures of performance, boards may put higher weights on nonfinancial performance measures, such as product quality, customer satisfaction, and market share, in the cash compensation contracts (Banker et al. 2000) .
Furthermore, the coefficients on IRRE* ΔROA and IRRE* RET are not significant, indicating that the decrease in pay performance sensitivity following restatements does not differ significantly between accounting errors and irregularities. The results are consistent with prior findings that systematic and intentional earnings management exists prior to restatements for both non-fraudulent and fraudulent restatements (Ettredge et al. 2010) and that the board takes disciplinary actions against top executives even for firms with non-fraudulent restatements (e.g., Burks 2011) .
Columns III to VI present the results for the full sample based on models (1) through (4), respectively. The results are consistent with those for the restating sample. In all the four columns, the coefficients on both POST*ΔROA and POST*RET are negative at the 0.01 level, suggesting a decrease in pay performance sensitivity after a restatement. More importantly, the coefficients on both RESTATE*ΔROA (coefficient = 0.442 and 0.443 in Columns IV and VI, respectively) and RESTATE*RET (coefficient = 0.050 and 0.049 in Columns IV and VI, respectively) are positive at the 0.01 level, indicating that the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices for restating firms in the pre-restatement period is significantly higher than that for non-restating firms. The results support the argument that excessive pay performance sensitivity may lead to earnings restatements and financial frauds (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2003). Table 5 examines whether the impacts of restatements on the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices differ between extant and new CEOs. Columns I and II present the results based on the sample of restating firms and the full sample, respectively. The coefficient on POST*ΔROA (coefficient = -1.164 and -1.194 in columns I and II, respectively) is negative and the coefficient on EXCEO* ΔROA (coefficient = 0.773 and 0.697 in columns I and II, respectively) is positive at the 0.01 level, suggesting that firms decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings for new CEOs after restatements and that the downward adjustment of this sensitivity is muted for restating firms with extant CEOs. The results are consistent with hypothesis 2 that extant CEOs may have the ability and power to influence the design of cash compensation contracts and to retain a relatively high level of sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings even after restatements.
Furthermore, the coefficient on POST*RET (coefficient = -0.132 and -0.111 in columns I and II, respectively) is negative at the 0.01 level, suggesting that firms also decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to stock prices for new CEOs after restatements. In addition, we find mixed evidence on whether restatements have differential impacts on the sensitivity of cash compensation to stock prices between extant and new CEOs. In particular, the coefficient on EXCEO*RET is not significant in column I, but is significantly positive (coefficient = 0.062) at the 0.10 level in column II. Table 3 reports the correlations of the main variables. The Pearson (Spearman) correlations are shown above (below) the diagonal. P-values for each correlation coefficient are reported in the parentheses. All the variables are as defined in Panel A of Table 1 . Table 4 reports the effects of restatements on the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices. Columns I and II of Panel A present the results for the sample of restating firms based on models (1) and (3), respectively. Columns III to VI present the results for the full sample based on models (1) through (4), respectively. 
All the variables are as defined in Panel A of Table 1 . The intercept, and fixed firm and year effects are included in the regressions, but are not reported. *, **, and *** denote significance of coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively, using a two tailed test. Table 5 examines whether the impacts of restatements on the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices differ between extant and new CEOs. Columns I and II present the results for the sample of restating firms and the full sample based on models (5) and (6) 
All the variables are as defined in Panel A of Table 1 . Columns I and II present the results based on the full sample and the sample of restating firms, respectively. The intercept, and fixed firm and year effects are included in the regressions, but are not reported. *, **, and *** denote significance of coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively, using a two tailed test. Table 6 reports the moderating role of institutional ownership in the downward adjustment of the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings for new CEOs after restatements. Columns I and II present the results based on the sample of restating firms and the full sample, respectively. Consistent with hypothesis 3, the coefficient on INST*NEWCEO*ΔROA (coefficient = -2.081 and tstat = -2.99 in column I; coefficient = -1.426 and t-stat = -2.35 in column II) is significantly negative, suggesting that the decrease in the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings for new CEOs after restatements is more pronounced for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership. In contrast, the coefficient on INST*NEWCEO*RET is not significant in both columns, suggesting that institutional ownership does not affect the adjustment of the sensitivity of cash compensation to stock prices after restatements.
In addition, CEO ownership (CEOOWN), the percentage of independent directors (DIRPER), and the ownership of independent directors (DIROWN) appear not to affect the adjustment of pay performance sensitivity after restatements. Overall, the results reported in Table 6 highlight the important governance and monitoring role of institutional ownership in the downward adjustment of the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings following restatements. 
All the variables are as defined in Panel A of Table 1 . Columns I and II present the results based on the full sample and the sample of restating firms, respectively. The intercept, and fixed firm and year effects are included in the regressions, but are not reported. *, **, and *** denote significance of coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively, using a two tailed test. 
Additional Analysis
In this section, we first examine whether the SOX may affect the downward adjustment of the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices. Prior studies suggest an increase in the strength of corporate governance after the SOX. We thus expect that the downward adjustment of the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings should be stronger in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-SOX period. The full sample is partitioned into two subsamples: the pre-SOX sample including all the firm-year observations from 1995 to 2001 and the post-SOX sample covering the period of 2002-2011. We then repeat our analyses for the two subsamples. Table 7 compares the effects of restatements on the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices in the pre-SOX period to those in the post-SOX period. Columns I and II report the results in the pre-SOX period based on models (2) and (4), respectively. The coefficient on POST*ΔROA is not significant in both columns I and II, suggesting that firms do not decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings after restatements in the pre-SOX period. Interestingly, the coefficient on POST*RET is positive, suggesting that firms increase the sensitivity of cash compensation to stock prices after restatements in the pre-SOX period. One possible explanation for this result is that the board may increase the weight on stock prices in cash compensation to constrain managers' myopic focus on earnings in the pre-SOX period.
Columns III, IV, and V report the results in the post-SOX period based on models (2), (4), and (6), respectively. Consistent with the results in Tables 4  and 5 , the coefficient on POST*ΔROA is negative in all the three columns and the coefficient on EXCEO*ΔROA is positive in Column V, suggesting that firms decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to accounting earnings after restatements and this decrease is less pronounced for firms with extant CEOs. In other words, the introduction of SOX seems to have had a positive impact on board monitoring of executive compensation practices. Untabulated results also indicate that the downward adjustment of the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings is also larger for firms with a higher level of institutional investors. Taken together, the results reported in Table 7 are consistent with the deficiency in corporate governance in the pre-SOX period and suggest that the results documented in Tables 4-6 are driven by the post-SOX period.
We next examine whether restating firms decrease the sensitivity of equity compensation to earnings and stock prices following restatements for the full sample (The results based on the sample of restating firms are similar to those reported in Tables  7 and 8.) . We begin with a model similar to model (2) to examine the effects of restatements on the sensitivity of equity compensation to earnings and stock prices. 
RET
We then add IRRE, IRRE*ΔROA, and IRRE*RET as additional explanatory variables into model (9) Table 8 reports the results based on models (9) and (10) . In contrast to the results regarding the sensitivity of CEO cash compensation, the coefficients on POST*ΔROA and POST*RET are not significant in both columns, suggesting that restatements do not affect the sensitivity of equity compensation to earnings and stock prices. In addition, the coefficients on RESTATE*ΔROA and RESTATE*RET are not significant, indicating no difference in the sensitivity of equity compensation between restating firms in the pre-restatement period and non-restating firms. The coefficients on IRRE*ΔROA and IRRE*RET in column II are also not significant, suggesting that the board does not adjust the sensitivity of equity compensation even after restatements classified as irregularities. Table 7 compares the effects of restatements on the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings and stock prices in the pre-SOX period to those in the post-SOX period. Columns I and II report the results in the pre-SOX period based on models (2) and (4), respectively. Columns III, IV, and V report the results in the post-SOX period based on models (2), (4), and (6) 
All the variables are as defined in Panel A of Table 1 . Columns I and II present the results based on the full sample and the sample of restating firms, respectively. The intercept, and fixed firm and year effects are included in the regressions, but are not reported. *, **, and *** denote significance of coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively, using a two tailed test. Table 8 reports the effects of restatements on the sensitivity of equity compensation to earnings and stock prices for the full sample based on models (9) and (10) . Column I reports results based on the following model. 
All the variables are as defined in Panel A of Table 1 . The intercept, and fixed firm and year effects are included in the regressions, but are not reported. *, **, and *** denote significance of coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively, using a two tailed test.
Conclusion
Recent accounting scandals in the last decade or so have raised questions about the board of directors monitoring effectiveness with respect to the actions of the management and their compensation contracts. We attempt to study this issue; specifically we examine whether the board of directors adjusts the sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance measures following an earnings restatement. Using a sample of 598 restating firms and 2,065 non-restating firms during the period of 1995-2011, we find that firms decrease the sensitivity of cash compensation to accounting earnings after restatements. This is an important piece of evidence in the corporate governance literature, because it provides comfort to the notion of the board serving as an important monitoring institution when it comes to formulating optimal management compensation contracts. It shows that when the integrity of performance measures is manipulated, the board responds by putting a lesser weight on that performance measure in the compensation contract.
To obtain deeper insights into this result, we also explore whether these results are moderated by other factors. We find that the decrease in sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings is more pronounced for firms who hire new CEOs after restatements than those who continue to remain in the firm after the restatement. This result shows that while boards have retained their monitoring obligations, its independence seems to have been weakened by the power and influence that a CEO may have over the board. Furthermore, we also find that this decrease in the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings after a restatement is more pronounced for firms with a higher level of institutional ownership. The results suggest that institutional monitoring acts as a complement to the board-level monitoring in formulating optimal management compensation contracts. Overall, these results are consistent with the argument that the board performing its monitoring obligations efficiently by optimally adjusting the sensitivity of cash compensation to earnings downwards following restatements in order to constrain earnings management and recover public confidence in the firm among shareholders and investors.
The scope of this study is limited in that it considers a single dimension of earnings management, i.e. the violation of GAAP as manifested in an earnings restatement. Future research may focus more closely on earnings management that exists within GAAP rules (e.g., abnormal accruals, loss avoidance, or real earnings management) and examine whether the board proactively adjusts compensation contracts in response to abnormal accruals or other signals of earnings management. Furthermore, it would be also interesting to examine actual compensation contracts and investigate what specific performance metrics are involved and how the weight on each metric is modified by the board while adjusting the pay performance sensitivity to constrain earnings management.
